Syndicate Exchange Corporation, Adventure Partners, LTD. v. Crusher Rental & Sales, Inc., Larry Eilers  : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Syndicate Exchange Corporation, Adventure
Partners, LTD. v. Crusher Rental & Sales, Inc., Larry
Eilers : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jesse C. Trentdue; Noah M. Hoagland; Suitter Axland PLLC; Attorneys for Appellee.
Bryan J. Pattison; Durham, Jones & Pinegar, P.C.; Thomas J. Burns; Durham, Jones & Pinegar, P.C.;
Cyndi W. Gilbert; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Syndicate Exchange Corporation, Adventure Partners, LTD. v. Crusher Rental & Sales, Inc., Larry Eilers, No. 20080298 (Utah
Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/822
CQiendauc! 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
*l'/Adorn 
SYNDICATE EXCHANGE 
CORPORATION, a Texas corporation, 
and ADVENTURE PARTNERS, LTD., a 
Texas limited partnership, 
Plaintiffs/Appellee, 
CRUSHER RENTAL & SALES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and LARRY EILERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20080298-CA 
On appeal from an order and final judgment of the Fifth District Court for Iron County 
The Honorable J. Phillip Eves and G. Michael Westfall, District Court Judges 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT CRUSHER RENTAL & SALES, INC. 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Noah M. Hoagland 
Suitter Axland PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 510506 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0506 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Bryan J. Pattison (8766) 
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(435) 674-0400 
Thomas J. Burns (8918) 
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Cyndi W.Gilbert (4513) 
991 S. Toquer Blvd. 
P.O. Box 190 
Toquerville, Utah 84774 








SLC 265323 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SYNDICATE EXCHANGE 
CORPORATION, a Texas corporation, 
and ADVENTURE PARTNERS, LTD., a 
Texas limited partnership, 
Plaintiffs/Appellee, 
v. 
CRUSHER RENTAL & SALES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and LARRY EILERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20080298-CA 
On appeal from an order and final judgment of the Fifth District Court for Iron County 
The Honorable J. Phillip Eves and G. Michael Westfall, District Court Judges 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT CRUSHER RENTAL & SALES, INC. 
Bryan J. Pattison (8766) 
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(435) 674-0400 
Thomas J. Burns (8918) 
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Jesse C. Trentadue Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Noah M. Hoagland 
Suitter Axland PLLC Cyndi W. Gilbert (4513) 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 991 S. Toquer Blvd. 
P.O. Box 510506 P.O. Box 190 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 -0506 Toquerville, Utah 84774 
Attorneys for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
SLC 265323 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. THE JUDGMENT AGAINST BUTTONWILLOW COMPACTION 
MATERIALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED AGAINST 
SYNDICATE 1 
A. THROUGH ITS CONTRACT WITH BCM, SYNDICATE 
ASSUMED BCM'S ROLE, LIABILITY, AND JUDGMENT 1 
B. SYNDICATE'S argument RELIES ON INAPPLICABLE 
AUTHORITY 4 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISQUALIFY 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s 
Cases 
All Bay Mill & Lumber Co., Inc. v. Surety Co. of the Pacific, 208 
Cal. App. 3d 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) 5, 6 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58 P.3d 1158 4 
City of El Paso v. Soule, 6 F. Supp. 2d 616 (W.D. Tex 1998) 12 
Drill South, Inc. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 
2000) 8 
Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 
54, 94 P.3d 292 1, 3 
Frowv.DeLaVaga, 82 U.S. 552 (1872) 7 
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341 (5th 
Cir. 1981) 11 
Int'l controls Corp. v. Vesco, 535 F.2d 742, (2nd Cir. 1976) 7 
Marguilies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985) 11,13 
National Technical Systems v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 97 
Cal. App. 4*415 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 5, 6 
Poly Software International, Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. 
Utah 1995) 10 
Schaffter v. Creative Cap. Leasing Group, LLC, 166 Cal. App. 4th 
745 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 1 
Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985) 10, 11 
Southerland v. Gross, 772 p.2d 1287 (Nev. 1989) 4 
Sutter v. Payne, 989 S.E.2d 887 (Ark. 1999) 4 
Other Authorities 
Former-Client Conflicts, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 677 (1997) 9 
Rules 
FRCP 54 7 
ii 
SLC 265323 1 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDGMENT AGAINST BUTTONWILLOW COMPACTION 
MATERIALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED AGAINST 
SYNDICATE 
Although Syndicate goes to great lengths to distance itself from 
Buttonwillow Compaction Materials ("BCM") and the default judgment entered 
against BCM, Syndicate's efforts require not only reading out material provisions 
of Syndicate's agreement with BCM but also the resort to inapplicable authority 
and to doctrines that have not been accepted in either California or Utah. 
A, THROUGH ITS CONTRACT WITH BCM, SYNDICATE 
ASSUMED BCM'S ROLE, LIABILITY, AND JUDGMENT 
Syndicate has attempted to distance itself from the duties that it assumed 
under the provisions of its agreement with BCM and to describe itself, and its 
duties, in the simplest and least burdensome terms. However, the plain language 
of the agreement strongly contradicts Syndicate's position, and advocates, almost 
without question, for the adoption of the position Crusher has put forward. 
Under Utah, and California, law, contracts must be enforced according to 
their plain language, see Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 
2004 UT 54, % 10, 94 P.3d 292; Schaffter v. Creative Cap. Leasing Group, LLC, 
166 Cal. App. 4th 745, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ('"We infer the parties' intent 
from the written provisions of the contract [which are] "to be understood in their 
ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning.'""), 
and under the plain language of the Assignment of Cause of Action (the 
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"Contract"), Syndicate became not only BCM's indemnitor, but also its surety, 
insurer, and, in effect, guarantor. 
Only two provisions of the Contract are material to the instant appeal. 
First: The Assignment of the Claims provision. (R. 1134.) Under this provision, 
BCM agreed to assign to Syndicate all of its rights, interests, and title to any 
claims that BCM might otherwise have had against Crusher. (Id.) In turn, 
Syndicate assumed full responsibility for all of BCM's responsibilities pursuant to 
the dispute with Crusher Syndicate as if Crusher actually were BCM. Second: 
The Indemnification provision. (Id.) Under this provision, Syndicate agreed not 
only to generally indemnify BCM from any of Crusher's possible claims against 
it, but also to hold BCM harmless, to defend BCM from these claims, and to 
assume total responsibility for all costs or losses that BCM might suffer or incur as 
a result of any litigation between BCM and Crusher. (R. 1134.) Assuming, as this 
court must, that the parties intended to give life to all of the provisions of the 
Contract, and that the parties intended all of the provisions of the Contract to have 
meaning, Syndicate's assertion that the Contract is a mere indemnification 
agreement is untenable. Syndicate agreed to far more that simple indemnity in 
both the first and second material provisions of the Contract, and although one 
could read each of these provisions as implying indemnification, such a reading 
would require reading out of the contract several provisions that the parties clearly 
intended to adopt, and such an interpretation would be contrary to accepted 
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authority on this issue. See Fairbourn Commercial 2004 UT 54, f^ 10 (noting that 
all provisions of a contract are to be given effect, and none are to be ignored). 
Applying this authority to the provisions of the Contract, the inevitable 
conclusion is that Syndicate bargained to become far more than a simple 
indemnitor. Rather, Syndicate bargained to assume BCM's position in every way 
concerning the dispute with Crusher. As asserted by Syndicate itself, Syndicate 
bargained become the indemnitor. But it also agreed to guarantee that no harm 
would come to BCM, and it agreed to assume the role of defender and insurer of 
BCM, eliminating the need for BCM to respond to any complaint filed by Crusher, 
and eliminating the need for BCM to retain legal services, or to incur any costs 
related to a potential legal action. In fact, pursuant to the Contract, Syndicate 
agreed not only to indemnify and defend BCM against any possible legal action or 
harm, it insured BCM that no harm would come to it, and it guaranteed that any 
costs incurred, and any responsibility imposed, would be bome solely by 
Syndicate. Consequently, contrary to the oversimplified interpretation urged by 
Syndicate, under the terms of the Contract, Syndicate assumed all of the rights, 
responsibilities, and duties that otherwise would have inured to BCM in this 
matter, and in doing so, Syndicate not only assumed the role of indemnitor, surety, 
insurer, and guarantor for BCM, but it in effect assumed BCM's position in the 
dispute and accepted responsibility for the judgment rendered by the trial court. 
SLC 265323.1 
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B. SYNDICATE'S ARGUMENT RELIES ON INAPPLICABLE 
AUTHORITY 
The applicable authority cited by Crusher is contrary to the trial court's 
refusal to apply the BCM judgment against Syndicate and supports Crusher's 
position on this issue. Moreover, contrary to the assertions of Syndicate, this 
authority advocates for the reversal of the trial court's refusal to apply the 
judgment against Syndicate in this matter. 
First, in attempting to evade the responsibility that it agreed to assume, 
Syndicate asserts that Crusher's position is barred by the Common or Joint 
Defense Doctrine. See, e.g. Sutter v. Payne, 989 S.E.2d 887 (Ark. 1999); 
Southerland v. Gross, 772 p.2d 1287 (Nev. 1989). However, Syndicate's brief 
constitutes the first and only mention of this doctrine in this matter, precluding its 
use as support for the trial court's decision. See generally Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 
UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158 (limiting the application of the affirm on any grounds 
doctrine). Further, a review of both Utah and California authorities reveals that 
neither jurisdiction ahs adopted the doctrine, although logic would dictate that the 
opportunity has been presented in both jurisdictions. Additionally, to the extent 
that the joint defense doctrine has acquired any standing within either California or 
Utah, it is simply inapplicable to the instant case. 
Under the common defense doctrine, the defense set forth by one defendant 
may be extended to & joint defendant '"where the defense interposed by [the] 
answering defendant is not personal to himself,.. .but common to all.'" Ex rel 
SLC_265323.1 
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Everett, 544 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Ore. 1976) (citation omitted). Here, Crusher's 
effort to extend liability to Syndicate and its principal was, as recognized by the 
trial court, an overextension. Simply put, Crusher had never entered into any 
relationship with Syndicate or its principal, and its efforts to extend liability to 
them were therefore unsuccessful. In contrast, Crusher's sole relationship was 
with BCM, and only BCM and Crusher had discussed and contracted for crushing 
equipment. As a result, the defenses interposed by Syndicate and its principal 
were personal to them, and not common to both themselves and BCM. 
Consequently, Syndicate's resort to the joint defense doctrine should be soundly 
rejected. 
Similarly, Syndicate's efforts to rely upon foreign authority to reduce the 
scope of responsibility that it assumed as BCM's surety are also inapplicable. In 
this effort, Syndicate cites the court to several cases, including National Technical 
Systems v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 97 Cal. App. 4th 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002) and All Bay Mill & Lumber Co., Inc. v. Surety Co. of the Pacific, 208 Cal. 
App. 3d 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). However, contrary to Syndicate's assertion, this 
authority does not support Syndicate. For instance, in All Bay, the court was 
asked to interpret the scope of a sureties' responsibility pursuant to a statute that 
defines the responsibilities of a surety to a contractor. See 97 Cal. App. 4th at 15. 
In response, the All Bay court held that the sureties' responsibility were limited to 
the terms articulated within the plain language of the statute being analyzed. See 
id. In contrast, here, Syndicate's responsibility were assumed pursuant not to 
5 
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statutory authority, nor are they controlled by any applicable statute, rather, 
Syndicate's responsibilities arise from the Contract, rendering All Bay easily 
distinguishable. 
In National Technical, the court reviewed whether a surety was bound by a 
judgment entered against the principle in an action in which the surety did not 
participate and had no opportunity to participate. See 97 Cal. App. 4th at 417. 
The court found, relying on All Bay, that under the circumstances the default 
judgment was not applicable against the surety. Id, at 422. However, the court 
then carefully noted that its reasoning was predicated upon the absence of notice: 
Stating that where notice is provided "the surety may move to intervene in the 
action, or it may simply elect to await the final judgment in the action and the 
[principal's] enforcement of the liability on the bond," actions not available to the 
surety in the absence of notice. Id As applied to the instant case, two elements 
distinguish National Technical from the instant case. First, here, unlike in 
National Technical, no bond was asked for or issued; rather, Syndicate assumed 
BCM's role and responsibilities as a result of its decision to enter into the 
Contract. Second, and to Crusher's clear advantage, unlike the surety in National 
Technical, Syndicate had notice of the action that Crusher filed against BCM and 
chose to sit idly by. Syndicate allowed default to issue and allowed the default 
judgment to be entered, but only after having been fully apprised of Crusher's 
efforts against BCM. Thus, to the extent that National Technical is material to this 
case, it supports Crusher's argument. 
6 
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Finally, Syndicate asserts that its success at trial precludes it being bound 
by the BCM default judgment. However, the authority cited by Syndicate is 
unpersuasive, not only because of the language found in more persuasive 
authority, but also because the doctrine supported by these authorities is predicated 
upon the inapplicable common defense doctrine. The best example of Syndicate's 
error in relying on this line of cases is found in Frow v. De La Vaga, 82 U.S. 552 
(1872). 
In Frow, an extremely brief opinion—one-half page in length—the 
Supreme Court held, pursuant to rules of equity, that it would have been improper 
for the trial court to enter default judgment against one or more of several 
defendants, when the claim against the defendants were identical, or apparently 
identical. IdLat554. However, the Court did not explain the grounds for its 
holding, and did not articulate the facts that supported its conclusion. See id. 
Moreover, at least one Federal Court of Appeal has evaluated Frow in the 
intervening years and concluded that Frow was issued prior to the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that with the adoption of Rule 54 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Frow likely was robbed of any remaining legal 
force, rendering any reliance upon Frow after the adoption of the federal rules 
unreasonable. See Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 535 F.2d 742, 746 n.4 (2nd Cir. 
1976). Frow is emblematic of the cases that Syndicate has cited, and as a result, 
this Court should reject the cases as unpersuasive and not well-grounded. 
SLC_265323.1 
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In contrast, the analysis of Drill South, Inc. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 
1232 (11th Cir. 2000), provides perhaps the best insight into this issue. In Drill 
South, when presented with the question of whether a surety was bound by the 
default judgment entered against its principle, the Eleventh Circuit first 
determined that "the general rule that has emerged [on this issue is that a surety is 
bound by any judgment against its principal, default or otherwise, when the surety 
had full knowledge of the action against the principal and an opportunity to 
defend." Drill South, 234 F.3d at 1235.l "The law requires only that a surety have 
notice of and an opportunity to defend before it is bound by a judgment against its 
principal." Id As Crusher articulated in its opening brief, it is undisputed that 
Syndicate had notice of Crusher's claims against BCM, and not only an 
opportunity to defend BCM, but also an obligation to do so. (R. 1134). However, 
rather than carrying out the duty that it had assumed under the Contract, Syndicate 
merely ignored Crusher's claims against BCM, failing to file an answer, allowing 
default to be entered, and allowing a default judgment to issue, all without protest 
of any kind on any level by Syndicate. Under these circumstances, Syndicate 
simply has waived its opportunity to assert any defenses regarding Crusher's 
1
 Syndicate points out that the Drill South court acknowledged that "[substantial dispute exist in the law as 
to whether a default judgment rendered against a principal is binding upon the principal's surety," but 
Syndicate then fails to note that the dispute is, in essence, hollow, and that the better reasoned authority 
hold to the general rule that Crusher has asserted throughout these proceedings. Drill South, Inc. v. Int'l 
Fid. Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000). Syndicate also fails to acknowledge that the court in 
Drill South applied the "general rule" to circumstances largely identical, procedurally, to the instant case, 
which led that court to hold that a surety with notice and an opportunity to defend its principal was bound 
by any judgment rendered against the principal. Id. More precisely, the court held that because the surety 
"had full knowledge of the potential for default judgment... possessed numerous opportunities to defend 
the ultimate judgment" and had ample opportunity to defend the case against he principal on the merits. 
SLC 265323.1 
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claims against BCM, and as BCM indemnitor, surety, insurer, and guarantor, 
Syndicate is now required to assume full responsibility for the judgment against 
BCM. 
Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the trial court erred in 
refusing to apply the BCM judgment against Syndicate and reverse the trial court's 
decision on that issue. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISQUALIFY 
SYNDICATE'S TRIAL COUNSEL 
It is undisputed that attorney Scott Lilja ("Lilja"), who is a shareholder 
within the firm that acted a Syndicate's trial counsel, represented Crusher during 
the first ten (10) years of Crusher's existence, and that his representation extended 
not only to the crafting of business documents, but also to representing Crusher in 
litigation matters during that period. It is further undisputed that Lilja represented 
Crusher's principal in personal litigation matters, and that Lilja was intimately 
aware of the nature of Crusher's business practices, and the business and litigation 
tactics and strategy employed by its principal However, Syndicate argues that 
because Lilja played no direct role in Crusher's relationship with BCM, and 
because Lilja had actually ceased representing Crusher prior to BCM approaching 
Crusher in 2004, under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, the trial court 
properly rejected Crusher's motion to disqualify Lilja and his firm as trial counsel. 




In short, Crusher consistently has maintained, both to the trial court and on 
appeal, that the nature and extent of Lilja's representation of Crusher was more 
than sufficient to disqualify him, and by association his firm, from acting as 
Syndicate's trial counsel. Substantial authority supports Crusher's position, 
although Crusher concedes that no Utah court has yet addressed this exact issue. 
The most comprehensive discussion of the authority applicable to this issue is 
found in Charles W. Wolfram article, Former-Client Conflicts. Charles W. 
Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 677, 680 (1997). 
Wolfram's discussion distills the disqualification standard into one easily applied 
element: Maintaining client confidentiality. Id, at 687; see also Poly Software 
International Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1490 (D. Utah 1995) (stating 
"ethical rules are generally concerned with the behavior and regulation of the legal 
profession, and more specifically here with the protection of communications that 
a reasonable person would assume to be confidential"). Confidentiality is at risk 
any time that '"representation of the present client will involve the use of 
information acquired in the course of representing the former client.'" Wolfram, 
at 685 (quoting Restatement (second) of Conflicts § 213). And Crusher argues 
that "[o]nce a substantial relationship has been found, a presumption arises that a 
client has indeed revealed facts to the attorney that require his disqualification." 
Smith v. Whatcott 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985); see also id. 
(highlighting the panoply of jurisdictions that have adopted the presumptive 
conflict rule). Crusher further argues that Utah should join the large majority of 
10 
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jurisdictions that have adopted the presumptive rule, because such a rule "is 
intended to protect client confidentiality as well as to avoid any appearance of 
impropriety, [and] '[it] is intended to prevent proof that would be improper to 
make."' Id (quoting In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 
1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
Syndicate, rather than addressing Crusher's actual argument, attempts to 
deflect attention from the argument, arguing that Crusher's position is not 
supported under Utah law. However, Syndicate's crabbed reading of applicable 
Utah authority fails to acknowledge that Utah courts have recognized the 
importance of client confidentiality and of avoiding the appearance of impropriety 
that could embarrass both the courts and the Bar. For instance, in Marguilies v. 
Upchurch, the Utah Supreme Court noted that relatively few opinions related to 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct have been issued, but stated that "A 
lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. The basis of 
this tenet is that society's perception of the integrity of our legal system may be as 
important as the reality, since it is the perception that engenders public confidence 
that justice will be dispensed." 696 P.2d 1195, 1204 (Utah 1985) (quotations and 
citation omitted). Thus, after reviewing the circumstances of the matter before it, 
the Marguilies Court determined that the protection of the "integrity of the court 
system as well as the integrity of the [legal] profession" required the 
disqualification of trial counsel, even though counsel had not directly represented 
the defendants who sought the disqualification. Id at 1205. Further, although not 
11 
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the product of a Utah Court, the holding of City of El Paso v. Soule may prove 
most persuasive in this matter. See 6 F. Supp. 2d 616, 624 (W.D. Tex. 1998). In 
addressing the defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs counsel, the Soule court 
found that plaintiffs counsel had performed business related services for the 
defendant, and that "[i]t would be patently unfair to allow the same lawyer to 
represent interests adverse to a former client regarding the same business affairs, 
especially in light of the theories for recovery in, and the nature of, the underlying 
suit." Id at 624. Thus, the court granted the motion to disqualify to avoid the 
potential unfairness and to protect the integrity of the legal system. 
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, it appears that the trial court 
erred in refusing to disqualify Syndicate's trial counsel. First, it is undisputed that 
Lilja operated as both business and litigation counsel for Crusher and its principal 
for almost ten years. (R. 1313 Tr. 23:2-11, 16:18-20.) During that time, Lilja 
advised Crusher and its principal in business matters necessary to the foundation 
of the business and to grow the business. (R. 1313 Tr. 19:13-18.) Through this 
representation, Lilja had access to all of Crusher's business information, its 
contract formation documents and principal, as well as to the strategic and tactical 
basis for the decisions that were made by Crusher's officers and principals in 
operating Crusher. (R. 1313 Tr. 10:1-21, 11:7-21, 12, 24-27.) In essence, Lilja 
possessed the Crusher "playbook," which provided him, and by association, 
anyone associated with him, valuable insight into Crusher's operations, activities, 
and decision making processes. And more importantly to the instant case, Lilja 
12 
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was central in Crusher's structuring of rental agreements to prevent lessees from 
tying-up or claiming ownership interests in leased equipment. (R. 1313 Tr. 25:9-
14.) As a result, the information available to Lilja through his years of 
representing Crusher should be presumed to be substantially related to any dispute 
involving Crusher's leases, rental agreements, or other contracts issued in the 
course of Crusher's business operations. 
In turn, Lilja's possession of the Crusher playbook, by necessity, suggests 
that Lilja's involvement in any lawsuit against Crusher carries with it the 
appearance of impropriety that the Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility seek 
to avoid. See Marguilies, 696 P.2d at 1205. Lilja is presumed, or should be 
presumed, to possess confidential information obtained during his representation 
of Crusher, and he is charged with safekeeping this information. The length and 
nature of the relationship between Crusher and Lilja gives rise to this presumption, 
and the trial court erred in permitting any investigation into the nature of this 
information. Further, the trial court erred in failing to recognize that because of 
Lilja's presumed possession of potentially damaging confidential information, 
Lilja owes a duty to Crusher, and that pursuant to that duty, Lilja and his law firm 
should have been disqualified as Syndicate's trial counsel. The trial court's error, 
by definition, tainted the entire trial process. Therefore, Crusher now requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify and remand 
this matter back to the trial court for a new trial. 
SLC 265323 1 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for all of the aforementioned reasons, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's judgment and grant judgment for Crusher, or in that 
alternative, remand this matter for a new trial with instructions that Syndicate is to 
obtain new counsel. 
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